Whether or not cooperation is favored in evolutionary games on graphs depends on the population structure and spatial properties of the interaction network. The population structure can be expressed as configurations. Such configurations extend scenarios with a single cooperator among defectors to any number of cooperators and any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the network. For interaction networks modeled as regular graphs and for weak selection, the emergence of cooperation can be assessed by structure coefficients, which can be specified for each configuration and each regular graph. Thus, as a single cooperator can be interpreted as a lone mutant, the configuration-based structure coefficients also describe fixation properties of multiple mutants. We analyze the structure coefficients and particularly show that under certain conditions the coefficients strongly correlate to the average shortest path length between cooperators on the evolutionary graph. Thus, for multiple cooperators fixation properties on regular evolutionary graphs can be linked to cooperator path lengths.
Introduction
A central issue in evolutionary game theory is describing conditions for the emergence of cooperation [7, 27] . For games on evolutionary graphs with a single cooperator, the question of whether or not cooperation is favored over defection is generally settled for weak selection. The answer is given for regular graphs by a single quantity, the structure coefficients [1, 30, 40, 41] , while for graphs in general a quantity related to coalescence times can be used [2] . If there are multiple cooperators, the situation is more complicated [18, 34] . Recently, an approach has been proposed that analyses a given number of cooperators and defectors on the evolutionary graph as configurations describing any possible arrangement of strategies over players [10, 11, 36, 37] . The approach also defines structure coefficients applicable for each configuration and for each network of interaction modeled by regular graphs [11] .
Game dynamics with multiple cooperators may be interesting for at least two reasons. A frequently studied question is the appearance of a single cooperator by mutation that may or may not fixate in a frequency-dependent strategy updating process [8, 10, 30, 25, 33, 40, 41] . If, starting from a single cooperator configuration, fixation of cooperation succeeds, then the evolutionary process may undergo a transition through configurations with multiple cooperators. Thus, studying multiple cooperator configurations can be seen as an attempt to describe how the transition process creates evolutionary trajectories. Moreover, in social networks, it may be interesting to actively design conditions positive for cooperation. Such a design could involve the strategic placement of more than one cooperator to enhance the likelihood that cooperation prevails.
In this paper results are presented suggesting that for regular graphs fixation properties for any number of cooperators are strongly correlated to the cooperator path length, which is the average shortest path length between cooperators on the evolutionary graph. In other words, we can link a property of the evolutionary game (emergence of cooperation) to a property of the graph (a certain path length). Moreover, it can be observed that particularly large values of the structure coefficient can be found for the cooperators clustering on cycles of the interaction graph. This result implies that clustering is certainly helpful for cooperation to succeed and suggests the conjecture that graphs with abundant and overlapping cycles of length up to the number of cooperators produce more favorable structure coefficients than graphs with few or separate cycles. We also discuss that these results are most important for small and intermediate numbers of players as the variance of structure coefficients over configurations ceases for the number of players getting large.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. 2 the methodological framework of configuration-based structure coefficients is briefly recalled, see [11, 37] for a more detailed description. The main results are given in Sec. 3, where we analyze and compare evolutionary graphs covering a wide range of graph-theoretical properties. It is shown how structure coefficients are distributed over configurations with the same number of cooperators and how structure coefficients correlate to cooperator path lengths. These relationships between fixation properties and cooperator path lengths relate to previous results for evolutionary games on lattice grids that show clusters of cooperators have better chances to survive [16, 17, 22, 32] . The findings are supported by results for networks with a varying number of players and coplayers. Finally, the results are discussed and conclusions are drawn about finding or designing best conditions to favor cooperation in evolutionary games on regular graphs.
Methods
We consider coevolutionary games with N players I = (I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I N ). Each pairwise interaction between 2 of these players, I i and I j , who thus are mutual coplayers, provides them with a payoff depending on which of 2 strategies, C i or D i and C j or D j , each player uses. Each player has k coplayers with 2 ≤ k ≤ N − 1. A (possibly varying) network structure defines which player interacts with whom. Such games are specified by (i.) the payoff matrix, (ii.) the interaction network, and (iii.) the configuration of the game [11, 36] . The 2 × 2 payoff matrix is
The interaction network is represented by an evolutionary graph. Each player I i belongs to a vertex i and an edge connecting vertex i and vertex j shows that the players I i and I j are mutual coplayers [2, 39] . Such an interaction graph is equivalent to the adjacency matrix A I ∈ [0, 1] N ×N . Set the element a ij of A I to a ij = 1 for an edge between vertex i and vertex j, and let a ij = 0 indicate that the players I i and I j are not coplayers. We consider coevolutionary games with no self-play where each player I i has the same number k of coplayers. Thus, the interaction graph is a simple k-regular graph. Finally, a configuration π = (π 1 π 2 . . . π N ) specifies the strategy π i ∈ {C i , D i } that each player I i , (i = 1, 2, . . . , N ), uses. With 2 strategies (C i and D i ) there are 2 N configurations. These configurations enumerate all possible arrangements of cooperators and defectors among the players. Additionally, the configurations describe any outcome of a player changing its strategy in a strategy updating process, for instance death-birth (DB) or birth-death (BD) updating [1, 33, 39] . It is convenient to binary code the strategies {C i , D i } → {1, 0}, thus having a binary string to specify the strategies of all players [11, 36] . Consider the example of N = 4 players. There are 2 4 = 16 configurations. For instance, the configuration π = (π 1 π 2 π 3 π 4 ) = (0110) shows that players I 2 and I 3 cooperate, while I 1 and I 4 defect. As cooperation is coded as C i = 1, the Hamming weight of the string π (the count of 1-elements in π) gives the number of cooperators c(π) of a configuration π. Thus, π = (0110) has c(0110) = 2 cooperators. For 1 ≤ c(π) ≤ N − 1, there is more than one configuration π for the same number of cooperators c(π). For instance, there are N configurations for a single cooperator (c(π) = 1). The number # c(π) of configurations with the same number of cooperators c(π) can be calculated by:
with 1 ≤ c(π) ≤ N − 1 and
Recently, it was shown by Chen et al. [11] that for 2 × 2 games with N players, payoff matrix (1), any configuration π of cooperators and defectors and for any interaction network modeled by a simple, connected, k-regular graph, in the case of weak selection strategy C i is favored over
We call the quantity σ(π) the structure coefficient of the configuration π implying that it may have different values for different arrangements of cooperators and defectors decribed by π. The condition (3) generalizes the same condition with σ(π) = σ = (k+1)N −4k
(k−1)N , which applies to a single cooperator, and is independent of where on the network the single cooperator is initally located [23, 29, 40, 41] . Furthermore, is was shown that for weak selection, the matrix A I describing the replacement structure, and DB as well as BD updating, the structure coefficient σ(π) can be calculated with time complexity O(k 2 N ). In particular, for DB updating we have
with 4 local frequencies: ω 1 , ω 0 , ω 10 and ω 1 ω 0 , see [11] . For these local frequencies, the following probabilistic interpretation has been suggested. Suppose on a given interaction network a random walk is carried out with the starting vertex chosen uniformly-at-random. The local frequency ω 1 (or ω 0 = 1 − ω 1 ) is the probability that for a configuration π the player at the first step of the walk is a cooperator (or defector). The local frequency ω 10 is the probability that for a walk with 2 steps the player at the first step is a cooperator and at the second step it is a defector. Finally, if we carry out 2 random walks independent of each other, the local frequency ω 1 ω 0 is the probability that the player at the first step on the first walk is a cooperator, but a defector at the first step on the second walk.
To define the cooperator path length l c we call d ij (I i , I j ) the shortest path on the evolutionary graph between vertex i (= player I i ) and vertex j (= player I j ) given that both players are cooperators: π i = π j = 1. The quantity d ij (I i , I j ) can be calculated by variants of Dijkstra's algorithm with time complexity 
Results
Studying relationships between configurations π, structure coefficients σ(π) and cooperator path lengths l c starts with 6 different interaction networks with N = 12 players and k = 3 coplayers that represent a variety of graph properties, see Tab. 1 and Figs. 1-2, and also the Appendix 1 with Figs. 7-10 . We analyze the following graphs: Frucht [11, 14, 24] , truncated tetrahedral [35] , Franklin [12] , Tietze [6, 24] , Dürer and Möbius ladder [35] . Table 1 : Analysis of the structure coefficients σ(π) and the cooperator path lengths l c for varying numbers of cooperators 2 ≤ c(π) ≤ 6 and different graphs of size N = 12 and degree k = 3. The table shows the multiplicity of the structure coefficient # σ , the maximal and minimal structure coefficient, σ max and σ min , the multiplicity of the maximal and minimal structure coefficient, # σmax and # σmin and the multiplicity of the cooperator path length, # lc min and # lc max . Note that the number of configurations with the same number of cooperators are # c(π) = (# 2 , # 3 , # 4 , # 5 , # 6 ) = (66, 220, 495, 792, 924), which is calculated by the binomials # c(π) =
12!
c(π)!(12−c(π))! , see Eq. (2). The truncated tetrahedral graph, the Franklin graphs and the Möbius ladder graph are vertex-transitive. The multiplicities # σmax , # σmin , # lc min and # lc max are underlined if they match, which means # σmax = # lc min and # σmin = # lc max and implies the largest value of the structure coefficient σ(π) is uniquely determined by the smallest value of the cooperator path length l c , and vice versa. Furthermore, the results for the structure coefficients σ(π) are symmetric with respect to the number of cooperators, compare to Fig. 3 (a) ,(b). This means the values for # σ , σ max , σ min , # σmax and # σmin are the same for c(π) = {5, 7}, c(π) = {4, 8}, c(π) = {3, 9} and so on. For the vertex-transitive graphs this symmetry also applies for # lc min and # lc max .
Graph
Triangles Squares Of these graphs, 3 are just regular, but differ by having no non-trivial symmetry (Frucht) , possessing non-trivial automorphisms and being Hamiltonian (Dürer) or not (Tietze). The other 3 graphs are vertex-transitive, which is to say that some automorphism group acts transitively upon the graph's vertices. Informally speaking, vertex-transitive means the graphs look the same from any two vertices and thus have a higher degree of symmetry than graphs that are just regular. Additionally, the truncated tetrahedral, Tietze and Dürer graph have triangles (cycles of length 3), but are square free, while the Franklin and Möbius ladder graphs have squares (cycles of length 4), but are triangle free.
For these graphs large values of the structure coefficients σ(π) correspond to small values of the cooperator path length l c , and vice versa, suggesting the hypothesis that between the structure coefficients σ(π) and the cooperator path length l c there is an inversely proportional relationship. For example, the Frucht graph with 3 cooperators has the maximal structure coefficient σ max = 1.6897 for 3 configurations which all share that the 3 cooperators are distanced by the minimal l c = 1 and belong to one of the 3 triangles of the Frucht graph, see Fig A more detailed analysis of configurations π, structure coefficients σ(π) and cooperator path lengths l c for these interaction networks is given in the Appendix 1 with Figs. 7-10. Particularly, it is shown that for 4 cooperators, the largest or smallest value of l c in itself does not guarantee the smallest or largest value of σ(π). For instance, for the Franklin graph and 4 cooperators, c(π) = 4, not only the smallest value l c = 4/3, but also that the 4 cooperators form one of the squares, gives the largest structure coefficient σ max = 1.6539, Fig. 1(c) , while for the truncated tetrahedral graph, the minimal σ min = 1.4231 is obtained for the second largest value l c = 3, Fig. 10(e) . It can further be observed that the maximal and minimal value of σ(π) is rarely unique for a configuration π, even if the number of cooperators c(π) is constant.
In Tab. 1, the largest and smallest σ(π), denoted as σ max and σ min , are given for each 2 ≤ c(π) ≤ 6. The table also shows the multiplicity of the structure coefficients # σ , and the multiplicity of the maximal and minimal structure coefficient, # σmax and # σ min as well as the multiplicity of the maximal and minimal cooperator path length, l a max and l a min . The multiplicity of the structure coefficient # σ is the number of different values of σ(π). For instance, for the Frucht graph and c(π) = 6, # σ = 25 means there are 25 different values of σ(π) over the # 6 = 924 configurations with 6 cooperators. Similarly, the multiplicity of the maximal structure coefficient # σmax is the number of configurations that have σ(π) = σ max . Thus, for the Franklin graph and c(π) = 5, # σmax = 12 means 12 out of 792 configurations have the maximal structure coefficient σ max = 1.6316. For # σ min , # l c min and # lc max this applies likewise.
Looking at the results in Tab. 1, we see some patterns over the 6 graphs considered, but also some differences. A first pattern is that the multiplicity of the structure coefficients # σ does not scale to the number of configurations # c(π) for each number of cooperators c(π). Clearly, for c(π) = 2 and # 2 = 66 configurations with 2 cooperators, we also get the smallest # σ in all cases given in Tab. 1, but as c(π) and # c(π) increases, the multiplicity of the structure coefficient # σ does not. The same property can also be found for the multiplicity of maximal and minimal σ(π) and l c . Another interesting result is that generally the multiplicity of the minimal σ min is larger than for the maximal σ max , that is, mostly we have # σmax ≤ # σ min . A possible interpretation is that finding a configuration π at random with the maximal structure coefficient σ max is less likely than finding a configuration with σ min . However, this interpretation should be viewed with respect to the number of configurations with the same number of cooperator # c(π) . For instance, for the Frucht graph, we get for 2 cooperators (c(π) = 2) the values # σmax = 9 and # σ min = 23. With # 2 = 66 configurations with 2 cooperators, the likelihood to find at random a configuration with σ max I 10 0
I 10 0
I 10 0 is 9/66 = 0.1364, while for σ min it is 23/66 = 0.3485. However, if we consider the same for 6 cooperators, we get 6/924 = 0.0065 and 24/924 = 0.0260 for σ max and σ min . In other words, looking at random for configurations with certain fixation properties might be promising for a small number of cooperators, but surely it is not for a larger c(π).
Comparing the graphs the most interesting result is that for the vertex-transitive graphs (truncated tetrahedral, Franklin and Möbius ladder) the multiplicity of σ max and σ min matches the multiplicity of l a min and l a max more often than for the other graphs, see Tab. 1, where in the columns for # σmax , # σ min , # l c min and # lc max the matching values are underlined. This means for the vertex-transitive graphs considered it is more likely that the largest value of the structure coefficient σ(π) is uniquely determined by the smallest value of the cooperator path length l c , and vice versa. While for the Frucht, Tietze and Dürer graph, there are 2, 4 and 2 matches, we get for the tetrahedral, Franklin and Möbius ladder graph 5, 6 and 7 matches. Thus, we can hypothesize that for vertex-transitive graphs the correlation between structure coefficients and cooperator path lengths might be stronger than for graphs that are just regular. The next set of numerical results deals with this hypothesis and generally with the proposed inverse proportional relationships between structure coefficients and cooperator path lengths. As shown above for different evolutionary graphs, the values of σ(π) (including the largest and smallest, but also intermediate values) form a discrete distribution with # σ different values. In other words, for every configuration π we have a structure coefficient σ(π) and a cooperator path length l c . As the configurations can be classified according to the number of cooperators c(π), we may study how the structure coefficients are distributed over c(π) and also over the range of the cooperator path length l c , see Figs. 3-4. The distributions are depicted as histograms and shown as violin plots. The number of bins of the histograms is calculated according to the Freedman-Diaconis rule [13, 38] , which is designed to minimize the error made by the partition. The central axis of each violin plot gives the range between largest and smallest value of σ(π). Fig. 3 shows some findings supporting the main results given with Fig. 4 by considering the Frucht graph and the Franklin graph. In the upper panels, Fig. 3 (a),(b) , the distributions of the structure coefficients σ(π) are given for each number of cooperators, 1 ≤ c(π) ≤ 11, while the lower panels, Fig. 3 (c),(d) , take the example of 6 cooperators (c(π) = 6) and depict the distributions for each unique value of the cooperator path length l c . The results for the distribution of σ(π) over the number of cooperators c(π), Fig. 3 (a),(b) , show some characteristics that can similarly be found for other graphs as well. A first characteristics is that the distributions are symmetric with respect to the number of cooperators c(π). A second is that for a single cooperator (or defector), c(π) = 1 or c(π) = N − 1 = 11, there is the same single value of the structure coefficient for all N = 12 configurations, see the blue line in Fig. 3 . With N = 12 and k = 3 this value reproduces the well-known result σ = [23, 29, 40, 41] . For 2 ≤ c(π) ≤ 10 cooperators we obtain structure coefficients σ(π) that are both larger and smaller than σ = 1.5, depending on the arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the graph, see Figs. 1 and 2 as well as the discussion in the Appendix 1. Put differently, for multiple cooperators the arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the evolutionary graph may substantially affect whether or not cooperation is favored, even if the number of cooperators is the same. Generally, the largest range between maximal and minimal value of σ(π) is not reached for c(π) = N/2 but for c(π) = N/2 ± 1 or c(π) = N/2 ± 2.
The distribution of σ(π) over c(π) for the Frucht graph, Fig. 3(a) , and the Franklin graph, Fig. 3(b) , are rather similar with the range between maximal and minimal value of σ(π) slightly larger for the Frucht graph. However, comparing the results with respect to how the structure coefficients σ(π) are distributed over unique values of the cooperator path length l c shows substantial differences between the graphs, see Fig.  3(c),(d) . Not only is the range of l c smaller for Franklin (1.73 ≤ l c ≤ 2.27) than for Frucht (1.60 ≤ l c ≤ 2.40), there are also fewer unique values (# lc = 9 vs. # lc = 13). Also, the range between σ max and σ min for each l c is smaller for Franklin than for Frucht. For other numbers of cooperators, and the other interaction graphs considered, we find similar results. This applies in particular to the general result that large values of σ(π) coincide very frequently with small values of l c , and vice versa. To visualize how the histograms scale over the number of cooperators, Fig. 4 aggregates the violin plots over c(π). Each violin is colored according to a color code for each c(π), and on the axis below and above the graph the maximum and the minimum value of l c is given for each c(π). By looking at this visual presentation of the relationships between structure coefficients c(π) and cooperator path lengths l c several observations can be made. The first is that for small and medium numbers of cooperators 2 ≤ c(π) ≤ 6 we see for all 6 graphs a clear reverse proportional relationship between c(π) and l c . For the vertex-transitive graphs this remains for 6 ≤ c(π) ≤ 10. Moreover, for these graphs the distribution of σ(π) for each value of l c shows a certain symmetry with respect to the number of cooperators. This is not true for the other 3 graphs. Given the fact that the whole distribution of σ(π) over c(π) is symmetric, see Fig. 3(a) ,(b), this symmetry found for the 3 vertex-transitive graphs is caused by the cooperator path length l c showing certain symmetry properties.
Compare the multiplicity # lc of l c . For instance, for the Franklin graphs we get the multiplicities of l c as # lc = {3, 3, 9, 5, 9, 5, 9, 3, 3} for the number of cooperators c(π) = {2, 3, 4, . . . , 9, 10}. As for the number of cooperators c(π) and the number of defectors d(π) there is c(π) + d(π) = N , the multiplicities # lc for c(π) matches that of N − c(π). By contrast, for the Frucht graph we get # lc = {4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 13, 11, 8}, which does not show this kind of symmetry. However, note that this symmetry does not mean that for each c(π) and N −c(π) we obtain the same values of the cooperator path length l c . For instance, for the Franklin graph with c(π) = 2 we have the values l c = {1, 2, 3}, while for c(π) = 10 the values are l c = {1.98, 2.00, 2.02}. We have the same number of unique values but their range shrinks for c(π) increasing. This appears plausible as for a small number of cooperators, for instance c(π) = 2, the cooperator path length can be as high as the diameter of the graph, while for larger c(π) the growing number of cooperators crowds the graph and makes average distances smaller. This symmetry property of the distribution of # lc over c(π), which can be found for the other 2 vertex transitives graphs as well, is related to the property that vertex transitivity implies the graph to be strongly distance balanced [19, 20, 21] .
We next analyze the relationships visualized in Fig. 4 by considering correlation coefficients. Fig. 5 shows the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient r and the Spearman rank correlation coefficient ρ, each between the variables σ(π) and l c . Pearson's r gives a measure of how well the relationship between the variables can be described by a linear function, Fig. 5(a) , while Spearman's ρ is a measure of how well the relationship matches a monotonic function, Fig. 5(b) . We notice that for small c(π) we obtain for both correlation coefficients and all 6 graphs values slightly bigger than −1, which indicates a strong inverse proportional relationship. For the 3 vertex-transitive graphs this strong correlation remains for all c(π), while for the 3 graphs that are just regular, the correlation weakens while c(π) increases. Comparing the two correlation coefficients shows that the relationships are better approximated by a linear than by a monotonic function. We close with a brief study of how the correlation between σ(π) and l c behaves for other N and k. Therefore, we analyze coevolutionary games with N = {10, 14, 20, 26} players, each for all 2 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 coplayers. Interaction networks are modeled as regular graphs, whose adjacency matrices A I are generated algorithmically [4, 5] . We discard graphs that are not connected and vertex-transitive, which is based on analyzing the Fiedler eigenvalue (the second-smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix kI − A I ) for connectivity [9] , and symmetry properties of transition matrices describing random walks on A I with Markov chain characteristics for vertex transitivity [42] . For each N and k, we use a set of 1000 different graphs. For N = {10, 14}, all 2 N configurations are analyzed. As analyzing all configurations could not be realized with the computational resources available in this study for N = {20, 26}, we sampled 25.000 configurations uniformly at random out of the whole set. Auxiliary results with different samples have shown that the error made in calculating the correlations by such a sampling is very small, which is plausible as there is an increasing number of configurations with the same σ(π) and l c . Fig. 6 shows the correlations expressed as Pearson's r, which are averages over all 1000 graphs. We see that the results generally support the claims made for the 6 graphs with N = 12 and k = 3. Particularity for 3 ≤ k ≤ N/2 coplayers the curves resemble those for the Frucht, the Dürer and the Tietze graph, see Fig. 5(a) . For k = 2 (cycle graphs), the strength of correlation increases with increasing c(π) (except for N = 26), while for k ≥ N/2 the correlations remain strong for an increasing number of cooperators, similar to the results for the vertex-transitive graphs. The results in Fig. 6 suggest that the correlations reported are not specific for the 6 graphs listed in Tab. 1, but apply more generally. Further works could study if this is also the case for N > 26 players.
Discussion
Whether or not cooperation is favored over defection in an evolutionary game on k-regular graphs with N vertices (= players) can be assigned in the case of weak selection by the structure coefficient σ(π) for any arrangement of cooperators and defectors described by a configuration π [11, 37] . As the emergence of cooperation is always opposed for BD updating, the focus here was on the apparently more interesting case of DB updating. For DB updating, σ(π) can be calculated with polynomial time complexity by Eq. (4). It was illustrated using the example of 6 different interaction networks modeled as regular graphs that for 2 cooperators (and up to N − 2 cooperators), the structure coefficients may vary over configurations, even if the number of cooperators is the same. Thus, if we interpret a single cooperator among defectors as a lone mutant, the results reported apply to configurations of multiple mutants as well. Furthermore, numerical results were given suggesting that the structure coefficients σ(π) can be linked to the cooperator path length l c by an inverse linear relationship. Additional results with a multitude of interaction graphs algorithmically generated with N = {10, 14, 20, 26} players and 2 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 coplayers confirm these findings. As this implies large values of σ(π) for low cooperator path lengths l c , and vice versa, the result provides another rationale for clusters of cooperators giving different fixation properties than cooperators that are sparsely distributed on the evolutionary graph. For evolutionary games on lattice grids clusters of cooperators have better chances to survive [16, 17, 22, 32] . Lattice grids can be understood as 4-regular graphs for Von Neumann neighborhoods and as 8-regular graphs for Moore neighborhoods. Clusters of cooperators have smaller cooperator path lengths than cooperators that are isolated. Thus, the results for lattice grids are consistent with (and a special case of) the findings for k-regular graphs given here.
The approach presented in this paper gives a methodology for analyzing how properties of interaction networks relate to arrangements of more than one cooperator and subsequently to fixation properties of the evolutionary game specified by the graph. It may add a new perspective at finding best conditions to favor cooperation. Within the framework and interpretation of evolutionary graph theory given in Sec. 2, this means looking for the best arrangement of a given number of cooperators on a given interaction graph, but possibly also for the best interaction graph with a given number and arrangement of cooperators, or the best combination of number, arrangement and graph. With the payoff matrix (1) and the structure coefficient σ(π) cooperation is favored if
Note that this condition indicates that the fixation probability of cooperation is higher than the fixation probability of defection, but entails no statement about the exact values of the fixation probabilities themselves. As known for the Frucht and for the Tietze graph, for a single cooperator the structure coefficient does not imply the exact value of the fixation probability of cooperation. For a single cooperator we have a single value of the structure coefficient but different fixation probabilities which may vary over initial configurations [24] . To refocus on whether or not cooperation is favored, consider, for example, the parametrization of the payoff matrix (1) used in the seminal work of Axelrod [3] Comparing the graphs suggests again a difference between the vertex-transitive graphs and those that are just regular with the 3 vertex-transitive graphs considered more rarely favoring cooperation with the parameters of the payoff matrix given. Whether this result is generally true for vertex-transitive graphs or an anomaly due to special properties of the truncated tetrahedral, the Franklin and the Möbius ladder graph should be addressed by future work. Thus, if we were just to consider the 6 interaction networks listed in Tab. 1, the Frucht graph with c(π) = 5 cooperators and configuration π = (1000 0000 1111) would be most favorable for cooperation as this combination of network and configuration yields the largest value σ max = σ(1000 0000 1111) = 1.7568. Due to the symmetry of σ(π) with respect to c(π) another solution is the configuration π = (0111 1111 0000) with c(π) = 7 and the same σ max = σ(0111 1111 0000) = 1.7568. In other words, if we view the parameter c = 5 of the payoff matrix of the PD game as the temptation to defect, then these 2 configurations would favor cooperation on the Frucht graph even if the temptation gets as high as c ≤ 3σ max = 5.2704 > 5. Moreover, for the PD game with a = 4 the reward to cooperate and d = 1 the punishment to defect, cooperation is Pareto-efficient as a − d = 3 > 0. Thus, the 2 configurations on the Frucht graph would favor cooperation even if the value of the difference between reward and punishment is as low as a − d ≥ 5/σ max = 2.8461 < 3. In a similar manner the effect of configuration and network on relations between the parameters of the payoff matrix can be studied, for instance on risk-dominance (a + b)/(c + d).
Another interesting aspect and pointer to future work comes from analyzing properties of the configurations with largest σ(π). We notice that π = (1000 0000 1111) indicates that the 5 cooperators are situated on the overlap of the square and a triangle of the Frucht graph, while the 7 cooperators of π = (0111 1111 0000) are on the overlap of 2 triangles and the hexagon (cycle of length 6). These results relate to findings showing for 3 and 4 cooperators that the largest structure coefficients σ(π) are frequently found for the cooperators located on triangles or squares of the evolutionary graph, see for instance This kind of discussion immediately leads to a related question, which is to design optimal conditions of cooperation. Freezing the values of the payoff matrix (1), the design space encompasses the initial configurations as well as the interaction networks. For games with 2 strategies and N players the number of configurations is 2 N and just considering evolutionary graphs that are regular their number grows for k = o( √ N ) with O(N N ) [36, 43] . Thus, while for a small number of players, such as N = 12 as in the examples discussed, and pre-selected interaction networks as in Tab. 1, a calculation of all σ(π) can be done, solving the design problem in general becomes numerically expensive for intermediate N and infeasible for N getting large. For designing configurations, there are, however, some further aspects. For N → ∞, the structure coefficients uniformly tend to σ(π) → σ = (k + 1)/(k − 1) [11, 30] . Put differently, whether cooperation is favored ceases to depend on which configuration the game has initially and thus solving the design problem ceases to be particularity meaningful for the number of players N getting large. Another aspect is the scaling of the number of configurations # c(π) over the number of cooperators c(π), which is governed by Eq. (2). Accordingly, # c(π) grows polynomially with c(π) for all c(π) = N/2, for instance by # 2 = (N −1)N/2 for c(π) = 2 or by # 3 = (N −2)(N −1)N/6 for c(π) = 3. Only for c(π) = N/2 and N → ∞, # N/2 grows exponentially. Thus, from a numerical point of view designing an optimal configuration for a given number of cooperators should remain feasible, except for c(π) = N/2, at least for N not as large as the structure coefficients becoming uniform with σ(π) ≈ σ ≈ (k + 1)/(k − 1). The results also have the potential to inform finding interaction graphs that are better suited than a random selection to either promote or suppress cooperation. For instance, the Franklin graph completely suppresses cooperation in the PD game discussed above, while the Frucht graph promotes cooperation much more. The analysis suggests that graphs with overlapping cycles of length up to the number of cooperators produce more favorable structure coefficients than graphs with few or separate cycles. Thus, we may potentially prescribe interaction networks with these properties and thus reduce the size of the design space.
The results given are for evolutionary game dynamics with weak selection and interaction networks modeled by regular graphs. The paper closes with brief comments on going beyond regular graphs and weak selection. Recently, an approach to assign fixation properties using coalescence times of random walks has been proposed that is suitable for a single cooperator and any graph structure [2] . If this technique can be extended to configurations with more than one cooperator, the approach given here would become applicable for graphs that are not regular. It is known that the validity of extrapolating results from weak to intermediate and strong selection is not always possible and depends highly on game characteristics, population size and spatial heterogeneity of the network [15, 26, 44] , but comparison between fixation probabilities has been shown to be fairly robust for a varying intensity of selection and a single cooperator [15] . It remains to be seen if this is also valid for any arrangement of cooperators and defectors. 
